# Origin of probabilities and their application to the multiverse

Andreas Albrecht UC Davis

2015: THE SPACETIME ODYSSEY CONTINUES
Stockholm
June 4, 2015

AA & D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014)

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# Thank you Katie!!!



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
AA & D. Phillips (PRD Dec 2014)

#### **Consumers**

#### Multipole moment, $\ell$ 10 50 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 Temperature fluctuations [ $\mu\,{\rm K}^2$ ] 5000 4000 3000 2000 0.1° 0.07° Angular scale



#### Producers




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#### Producers



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
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#### & Producers






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#### **Consumers**

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
Angular scale

0.1°

0.07°

#### & Producers





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Hartle, Srednicki, Aguirre, Tegmark, ...

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> AA: A deeper problem than the measure problems for Utiverse A potential issue even for finite models

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AA: Write paper explaining this with Phillips

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Perhaps this type of discipline can help resolve the measure problems of the multiverse/eternal inflation

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problem from the me sure problem for the multiverse

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probl prob' m. for the multiverse

- 1) Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
- Everyday probabilities
- 3) Be careful about counting!
- 4) Implications for multiverse/eternal inflation


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



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
NB: Very different subject from "make probabilities precise" in "Stanford sense".


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













Steinhardt 1982, Linde 1982, Vilenkin 1983, and (then) many others

# The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

Classically

Rolling

#### Self-reproduction regime



# The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

Self-reproduction regime

Classically Rolling A Classically Rolling B

Where are we? (Young universe, old universe, curvature, physical properties A, B, C, D, etc)

Classically Rolling D "Where are we?" 
Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions

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The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple classical rolling directions

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"Anything that can happen will happen infinitely many times" (A. Guth)

ckholm 6/4/15

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The multiverse of eternal inflation with multiple

classical rolling direct

Classicall, Rolling String theory landscape even more complicated (e.g. many types of eternal inflation)

Rolling B

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oknomia bx4x13

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Expect the theory to give you a probability distribution in this space... hopefully with some sharp predictions

### Quantum vs Non-Quantum probabilities

#### Non-Quantum probabilities in a toy model:

$$U = A \otimes B \qquad A:\{|1\rangle^{A}, |2\rangle^{A}\} \qquad B:\{|1\rangle^{B}, |2\rangle^{B}\}$$

$$U:\{|11\rangle, |12\rangle, |21\rangle, |22\rangle\} \qquad |ij\rangle \equiv |i\rangle^{A} |j\rangle^{B}$$

#### Quantum vs Non-Quantum probabilities

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$$U: \{|11\rangle, |12\rangle, |21\rangle, |22\rangle\} \qquad |ij\rangle \equiv |i\rangle^{A} |j\rangle^{B}$$

Measure A only: 
$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = (|i\rangle^{A} \langle i|) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B} = [|i1\rangle\langle i1| + |i2\rangle\langle i2|]$$

Measure *B* only: 
$$\hat{P}_i^B = (|i\rangle^B \langle i|) \otimes \mathbf{1}^A = [|1i\rangle\langle 1i| + |2i\rangle\langle 2i|]$$

Measure entire 
$$U$$
:  $\hat{P}_{ii} \equiv |ij\rangle\langle ij|$ 

Non-Quan

BUT: It is impossible to construct a projection operator for the case where you do not know whether it is A or B that is being measured.

$$U = A$$

 $A \mid j \rangle^B$ 

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**Could Write** 

$$\hat{P}_i = p_A \hat{P}_i^A + p_B \hat{P}_i^B$$

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Classical **Probabilities** to measure A, B

$$A \mid j \rangle^{E}$$

Does not represent a quantum measurement

ments 🗲 → Projection operators:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A} = (|i\rangle^{A} \langle i|) \otimes \mathbf{1}^{B} = [|i1\rangle\langle i1| + |i2\rangle\langle i2|]$$

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Does not represent a quantum measurement

ments 🗲 🗲 🛭

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{B} = \left(\left|i\right\rangle^{B}\right)$$

Page: The multiverse requires this (are you in pocket universe A or B?)

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 All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
 Our \*only\* experience

Our \*only\* experiences
with successful practical
applications of probabilities
are with quantum
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- All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities
- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin

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A problem for many multiverse theories

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- One should not use ideas from everyday probabilities to justify probabilities that have been proven to have no quantum origin

A problem for many multiverse theories (as practiced)

AA & D. Phillips 2014

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lassic

Prob ilities

to meas vre

A, B

Does not represent a quantum measurement

ments 🗲 🗲 🛭

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lassica Prob ilities to meas vre A, B

Where do these come from anyway?

Does not represent a quantum measurement

Measure entire *U*:

$$\hat{P}_{i}^{A}=\left(\left|i
ight
angle^{A}
ight)$$

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ments 🗲 🗲 🛭

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
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
## Outline


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
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
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


























$$\Delta b = \delta x_{\perp} + \frac{\delta p_{\perp}}{m} \Delta t = \sqrt{2} \left( a + \frac{\hbar}{2a} \frac{l}{m\overline{v}} \right) \qquad \psi \propto \exp\left( \frac{-x^2}{2a^2} \right)$$


$$\xrightarrow{\min} \Delta t = \sqrt{2} \left( \frac{\hbar l}{2m\overline{v}} \right) \equiv \sqrt{l + \frac{\hbar}{dB} / 2}$$

$$\xrightarrow{\text{brecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15}}$$

$$\psi \propto \exp\left(\frac{-x^2}{2a^2}\right)$$









Minimizing  $\rightarrow$  conservative estimates for my purposes (also motivated by  $\Delta b = \delta x_{\perp}$  decoherence in some cases)


$$\frac{\Delta v - v_{\perp}}{m}$$
 [deconerence in some cases]


$$2^{3/2} \left( \frac{\hbar l}{2m\overline{v}} \right) \equiv \sqrt{l + \frac{1}{2}} = \sqrt{l} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2}$$







Subsequent collisions amplify the initial uncertainty (treat later collisions classically → additional conservatism)





$$\Delta b_n = \Delta b \left( 1 + 2l / r \right)^n$$





 ${\it n_{\scriptscriptstyle O}}$  is the number of collisions so that

$$\Delta b_{n_Q} = r$$

(full quantum uncertainty as to which is the next collision)

$$n_{Q} = -\frac{\log\left(\frac{\Delta b}{r}\right)}{\log\left(1 + \frac{2l}{r}\right)}$$

$$\log\left(1 + \frac{r}{r}\right)$$

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{\partial B}$	$\Delta b$	$n_Q$
Air							
Water							
Billiards							
Bumper Car							

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{\partial B}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{O}$
Air							
Water							
Billiards							
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25



	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\lambda_{dB}$	$\Delta b$	$n_Q$
Air							
Water							
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25





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	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{2}$	$\Delta b$	$ n_{Q} $
Air							~
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25







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	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{2}$	$\Delta b$	$ n_{O} $
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-9}$	-0.3
Water	$3.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$3 \times 10^{-26}$	460	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$	0.6
Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-17}$	8
Bumper Car	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-18}$	25











	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{\partial B}$	$\Delta b$	$n_O$
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	2.9×10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.3
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Billiards	0.029	1	0.16	1	$6.6 \times 10^{-34}$	5.1 Qua	antum
Bumper	1	2	150	0.5	$1.4 \times 10^{-36}$	J.	every
Car						col	lision











## ${\it n_{O}}$ for a number of physical systems

#### (all units MKS)

	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{2}$	$\Delta b$	$n_{o}$
Air	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.4 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-26}$	360	$6.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-9}$	-0.3
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Car						col	llision







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 $(n_Q < 1 \rightarrow$ breakdown of formula, but conclusion robust)


	r	l	m	$\overline{v}$	$\frac{\lambda_{dB}}{\partial B}$	$\Delta b$	$ n_Q $
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Bumper	6000	0		.5	1		every
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
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
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(independent of "interpretation")





# An important role for Brownian motion: Uncertainty in neuron transmission times



$$\delta t_f = \delta t_n \times \left(\frac{v_h}{v_h + v_f}\right)$$

$$\delta t_t = \sqrt{2}\delta t_f$$


$$f = \frac{4v_f}{\pi d}$$

$$\delta N = f \delta t_t = 0.5$$

#### Using:

$$\delta t_n \approx 1 ms$$
  $v_h = v_f = 5 m / s$ 

$$d = 0.01m$$



#### Coin diameter = d

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
$$\delta N = f \, \delta t_t = 0.5$$

#### Using:

$$\delta t_n \approx 1 ms$$
  $v_h = v_f = 3$ 

$$v_h = v_f =$$

$$d = 0.01m$$



50-50 coin flip probabilities are a derivable quantum result


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
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
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Usin Without reference to "principle of indifference" etc.



50-50 coin flip probabilities are a derivable quantum result





$$\delta t_{t} = \sqrt{2}\delta t_{f}$$

$$f = \frac{4v_f}{\pi d}$$

NB: Coin flip is "at the margin" of deterministic vs random: Increasing d or deceasing  $v_h$  can reduce  $\delta N$  substantially

$$\delta N = f \, \delta t_{t} = 0.5$$

Coin diameter = d


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
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Still, this is a good illustration of how quantum uncertainties can filter up into the macroscopic world, for systems that \*are\* random.

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$$V_h$$

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Physical probability: To do with physical properties of detector etc

P(Data | Theory)

Bayes:

$$P(Theory | Data) = \frac{P(Data | Theory)}{P(Data)} P(Theory)$$

#### Bayes:

$$P(Theory \mid Data) = \frac{P(Data \mid Theory)}{P(Data)} P(Theory)$$

#### Probabilities of belief:

- Which data you trust most Which theory you like best

This talk is about physical probability only

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Adding new data (theory priors can include earlier data sets):

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- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument.

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#### Some further thoughts:

# Some further thoughts:

- Special relationship to cosmic structure from inflation: "probability censorship"
- A counterexample: Betting on the digits of Pi (Not!)
- Compare with classical computer
- Compare with color:





# Outline


- 1) Quantum vs non-quantum probabilities (toy model/multiverse)
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# **Outline**


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- "Randomness is (quantum) <u>physics</u>"
- Counting may or <u>MAY NOT</u> have a role in inferring or representing physical randomness


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
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


# Now ask: What is the probability that a ball drawn from the "Results" bowl is red?




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 Different physical "completions" of this question are possible which give different answers. (≈ measures)




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counting

## **Outline**

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
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
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
- No "volume factors"
- 2) Boltzmann Brain problem reduced
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
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
One semiclassical universe having many more possible observers in it than another (often counted by volume), does \*not\* give that universe greater statistical weight. Quantum branching ratio into one vs the other ( $p_A$  /  $p_B$ ) does count




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
Pocket B with  $P_B$ 




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This model has no "Boltzmann Brain" problem as long as  $\left|p_A\right|/\left|p_B\right|$  Is not too small

Pocket A with  $P_A$ 



Pocket B with  $P_B$ 




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
Pocket A with  $\overline{P_A}$ 

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


Boltzmann brains are observers which look good vs current data but which quickly go bad


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
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
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
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


Albrecht @ Stockholm 6/4/15

See also Guth & Vanchurin

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Albrecht @ S



- → Wavefunction cannot give probabilities for which pocket you are in.
- Time cutoff only there as (wrong) attempt to determine which pocket
- → The youngness/end of time problem is asking a question the theory cannot answer

#### **Conclusions**

- 1) All practically applicable probabilities are of physics (quantum) origin.
- 2) Counting of objects may or MAY NOT be a way of accessing legitimate quantum probabilities
- Standard discussions of probabilities in cosmology often make errors re 2)
- 4) 1) and care about 2) allow us to introduce better discipline into cosmological discussions (just say "no"). Implications so far:
  - a) No (counting based) volume factors
  - b) Reduced Boltzmann Brain problem
  - c) No youngness/end of time problem
  - d) Measure problems apparently resolved?
- 5) More rigorous treatment of eternal inflation (etc) needed to determine full implications.

- → I still have other concerns about eternal inflation that makes me prefer finite theories,
- → but this "probability discipline" may resolve what I used to think was the most troubling issue

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Clashes with my work on the "clock ambiguity"

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
ent @ Stockholm 6/4/15

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
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# **Additional Slides**


#### A note on "probability censorship"

## Cosmic structure



#### A note on "probability censorship"

## Cosmic structure



### All everyday probabilities are quantum probabilities

- Proof by exhaustion not realistic
- One counterexample (practical utility of non-quantum probabilities) will undermine our entire argument
- Can still invent classical probabilities just to do multiverse cosmology
- Not a problem for many finite theories (AA, Banks &

Compare with identical particle statistics

rousiv (symmetry?... simplicity? See

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3.1415926535

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  - **Etc**

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 $78235478163 \frac{1}{5}009341721641219924586315030286182974555706749838505494588586926995690927210797509302955321165344987202755960236480665499119881834797753566369807426542527862551818417574672890977772793800081647060016145249192173217214772350141441973568548161361157352552133475741849468438523323907394143334547762416862518983569485562099219222184272550254256887671790494601653466804988627232791786085784383827967976681454100953883786360950680064225125205117392984896084128488626945604241965285022210661186306744278622039194945047123713786960956364371917287467764657573962413890865832645995813390478027590099465764078951269468398352595709825822620522489407726719478268482601476990902640136394437455305068203496$ 

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
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  Fairness is about lack of correlation between digit choice
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```
\begin{array}{c} 42654252786 \\ 2331616417374072890977772793800081047000010143249192173217214772330 \\ 14144197356854816136115725252122475741840468428573323907394143334547762416862 \\ 518983569485562099219222 \\ 085784383827967976681454 \\ 626945604241965285022210 \\ 287467764657573962413890865832645995813 \\ 595709825822620522489407726719478268482 \end{array} \\ P_{\pi} = \lim_{N_{tot} \to \infty} \frac{1}{N_{tot}} \sum_{\{i\}} \left(N_{\pi}^{i} - 4.5\right) = 0 \\ N_{tot} = 0
```


Classical Computer: The "computational degrees of freedom" of a classical computer are very classical: Engineered to be well isolated from the quantum fluctuations that are everywhere

- Computations are deterministic
- "Random" is artificial
- Model a classical billiard gas on a computer:
  - All "random" fluctuations are determined by (or "readings of") the initial state.




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# Our ideas about probability are like our ideas about color:


 Quantum physics gives the correct foundation to our understanding


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 Fundamental quantum understanding needed to fix classical misunderstandings in certain cases.










Albrecht @ Stockh


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