Spectrum Allocation for Decentralized Transmission Strategies: Properties of Nash Equilibria
by
Bhavani Shankar(KTH Signal Processing)
→
Europe/Stockholm
RB 35
RB 35
Description
The interaction of two transmit-receive pairs coexisting in the same area and communicating using the same portion of the spectrum is analyzed from a game theoretic perspective. Each pair is utilizing a decentralized iterative water-filling scheme to greedily maximize the individual rate. We study the
dynamics of such a game and find properties of the resulting Nash equilibria. The region of achievable operating points is characterized for both low and high interference systems and the dependence on the various system parameters is explicitly shown. Utilizing global system knowledge, we design a modified game encouraging better operating points in terms of sum-rate compared to those obtained using the iterative water-filling algorithm and show how such a game can be imitated in a decentralized non-cooperative setting.
This work is carried out jointly with Peter von Wrycza, Mats Bengtsson and Bjorn Ottersten of Signal Processing Lab, KTH.
